![]() Is this vulnerability defeated if you use a APFS/HFS disk password that no specific OSX user accounts are authorized to bypass, as is the case when you encrypt the whole hard drive and then install OSX versus activating File Vault only on a per account basis? In other words, if I don't have the hard drive disk password, but I do have a single user account login/password, nothing is capable of being leaked in this case, correct?Īs the Quicklook database is never decrypted unless you have the disk password in this case, I don't think it is, but would like validation of my thought process as it seems like this mostly pertains to mounted encrypted image files or non-system encrypted drives, not whole disk system drive encryption. * As an aside, here's a vaguely-relevant #1 trending story in Australian media for the past few days (related in a general security sense which most people neglect - not necessarily disk encryption). It's laughable now to think I left it on the floor ("secured" by the 5-pin tumbler lock in my front door) without any kind of data/identity theft* protection for so long. I started using full drive encryption as soon as I started getting faster devices (i.e., not the Nexus 4) - in fact I've only not too long ago reformatted an external backup HDD (WD Green - unremarkable) to use LUKS encryption, and haven't really noticed a noticeable performance hit (Phoronix has some good benchmarks on various types of disk/folder encryption). Of course I like to poke around a new system and reconfigure everything only to immediately forget I made that change. The class key is protected by a combination of the user’s password and the hardware UID when FileVault is turned on.I thought it was the default too but now I'm thinking I've just been conditioned into accepting it as a sensible default* and might have automatically enabled it on my own accord after reading the instructions. Volume and metadata contents are encrypted with this volume encryption key, which is wrapped with the class key. All APFS volumes are created with a volume encryption key by default. On a Mac with Apple silicon and those with the T2 chip, all FileVault key handling occurs in the Secure Enclave encryption keys are never directly exposed to the Intel CPU. Provide a swift and secure method for wiping content via deletion of necessary cryptographic materialĮnable users to change their password (and in turn the cryptographic keys used to protect their files) without requiring reencryption of the entire volume Protect the system from a brute-force attack directly against storage media removed from Mac Require the user’s password for decryption This hierarchy of keys is designed to simultaneously achieve four goals: Internal volume encryption on a Mac with Apple silicon as well as those with the T2 chip is implemented by constructing and managing a hierarchy of keys, and builds on the hardware encryption technologies built into the chip. Starting in macOS 11, the system volume is protected by the signed system volume (SSV) feature, but the data volume remains protected by encryption. In macOS 10.15, this includes both the system volume and the data volume. Without valid login credentials or a cryptographic recovery key, the internal APFS volumes remain encrypted and are protected from unauthorized access even if the physical storage device is removed and connected to another computer. Internal storage with FileVault turned on iPhone Text Message Forwarding security.How iMessage sends and receives messages.Adding transit and eMoney cards to Apple Wallet.Rendering cards unusable with Apple Pay.Adding credit or debit cards to Apple Pay.How Apple Pay keeps users’ purchases protected.Intro to app security for iOS and iPadOS.Protecting access to user’s health data.How Apple protects users’ personal data.Activating data connections securely in iOS and iPadOS. ![]() Protecting user data in the face of attack.Protecting keys in alternate boot modes. ![]()
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